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STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS CERTIFIED 
This Court has accepted the following questions for certification: 
A. Whether an exhaustion clause, which excludes underinsured motorist 
coverage contained in an automobile insurance policy absent a condition 
precedent, is generally unenforceable in the State of Utah as contrary to the 
State's public policy, to wit: 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 
1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY 
LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE 
BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR 
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS; OR 
2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART OF 
THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED. 
B. Provided that the aforementioned exhaustion clause is not generally 
unenforceable in the State of Utah as contrary to the State's public policy, 
whether the enforceability of such clause is contingent upon the insurer 
establishing actual prejudice to its economic interest. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
(b)(i) "Underinsured motor vehicle" includes a motor vehicle, the 
operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability policy at the 
time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage 
to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(l)(b). 
(4) The inception of the loss under Subsection 31A-21-313(1) for 
underinsured motorist claims occurs upon the date of the last liability policy 
payment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(4). 
(5)(a) Within five business days after notification that all liability insurers 
have tendered their liability policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either: 
1 
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may 
have against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or 
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered 
by the liability carrier. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following his August 5, 2007 automobile accident, Tavis McArthur failed to 
exhaust the liability limits available to him under the tortfeasor's policy, opting to settle 
for $90,000 of the $100,000 in applicable limits. As such, underinsured motorist 
("UIM") coverage is precluded under the clear terms of his policy through State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), which requires, as a 
precondition to coverage, that all liability limits be exhausted. 
On August 5, 2007, Mr. McArthur was involved in an accident while riding on his 
motorcycle. (R. at 8-9.) Following that accident, Mr. McArthur decided to settle for only 
$90,000 of the $100,000 in liability limits available from the tortfeasor's liability carrier. 
(R. at 62.) He then made a demand for the $100,000 in UIM limits set forth under his 
State Farm Policy (the "Policy"). (R. at 62.) State Farm denied that claim due to the fact 
that Mr. McArthur had not exhausted the full limits of the liability policy, a precondition 
to coverage under the Policy. (R. at 62.) 
The Policy's exhaustion clause states as follows, in relevant part: 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W 
• • • 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 
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1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY LIABILITY 
BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY 
PAYMENT OR JUDGMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER 
PERSONS; OR 
2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART OF THEM 
HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED. 
(R. at 86.) (Attached as Addendum "B".) 
As a result of State Farm's denial, Mr. McArthur filed suit against State Farm in 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah ("District Court"), stating causes 
of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. (R. at 10-14.) The parties then decided to submit the legal question, the 
enforceability of the exhaustion clause, to the District Court by way of cross motions for 
summary judgment, without conducting discovery. (R. at 24.) The District Court 
granted State Farm's motion, dismissing all of Mr. McArthur's claims on the basis that 
there was no UIM coverage under the Policy because Mr. McArthur failed to comply 
with the clear exhaustion requirement and because the exhaustion clause did not violate 
the public policy of the State of Utah. (R. at 61-71.) (Attached as Addendum "C".) 
In reaching that conclusion, the District Court provided the following analysis: 
Because the statute mandates all drivers to have a UIM 
policy, absent a specific set of circumstances, and the statute 
directs the UIM carriers to pay benefits only after all liability 
insurers have tendered the limits of their policies, the 
legislature has stated in clear, unambiguous terms both the 
requirements of UIM coverage and the public policy of Utah 
as well. 
The contract language mirrors the statute in requiring the 
limits of the other available liability policies be paid out 
before the underinsured carrier, Defendant in this case, is 
liable to make additional payments to the insured. Although 
the Court is cognizant of the compelling public policy reasons 
for exhaustion clauses generally to be void for public policy, 
in the face of clear language from the legislature it will refrain 
from so holding. The Court understands and is sympathetic 
to the legitimate policy concerns, but does not believe its role 
is to make policy and will leave that duty to the legislature. 
Additionally, the Court is aware of other challenges to the 
limitations of Utah's underinsured motorist coverage whose 
public policy arguments were rejected by the Utah Court of 
Appeals, [citing Phillips v. Farmers Insurance Group, 2005 
WL 1477061 (Utah Ct. App. June 23, 2005) and State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Green, 89 P.3d 97 
(Utah 2003)] 
• • • 
To reiterate, because Utah does have a statutory scheme 
that contemplates and requires such an exhaustion provision 
the Court finds this clause is not void for public policy. 
(R. at 67-69.) 
Mr. McArthur appealed the District Court's decision to the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has certified the above questions to 
this Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The exhaustion clause that is the subject of the first certified question is not 
ambiguous. It clearly requires that third-party liability limits must be fully exhausted by 
payment or tender before first-party UIM benefits are payable. Thus, the contract's 
exhaustion is enforceable unless it is in violation of Utah's public policy regarding UIM 
coverage. 
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Utah's public policy is established by statutory provisions which define UIM 
coverage and set forth the framework under which UIM benefits may be obtained. That 
framework requires that all third-party liability benefits available to injured insureds be 
exhausted by tender before first-party UIM benefits are available to the injured insureds. 
The UIM exhaustion clause at issue here mirrors Utah's UIM statutory framework. 
Therefore, the contract clause is enforceable as it is consistent with Utah's public policy, 
as expressed by its legislature. This specific statutory approval of exhaustion clauses is 
the public policy against which the contract exhaustion clause is to be judged. Since the 
contract language does not violate this clear statement of public policy, other theoretical 
statements about public policy which do not recognize the controlling force of the Utah 
legislature's statement on exhaustion clauses are not relevant to the particular issue in this 
case. Nonetheless, there are a number of important policy considerations that justify 
exhaustion clauses, beyond the clear legislative approval, such as preserving UIM 
coverage as an affordable, secondary coverage, maintaining clear guidelines for the 
availability of such coverage, and protecting UIM carriers' subrogation rights. 
Regarding the second certified question, the enforcement of exhaustion clauses 
should not be contingent on an insurer establishing actual prejudice to its economic 
interests. The requirement of actual prejudice was addressed in State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97 (Utah 2003), where the insured breached the policy's 
consent to settle clause and then pursued a first-party UIM claim. The UIM claim was 
denied because the insurer lost its subrogation right under the policy as a result of the 
insured's breach of the consent to settle clause. This Court held that the first-party UIM 
5 
claim could only be denied as a result of the breach of the consent to settle clause, if the 
insurer could show that it had been actually prejudiced thereby—meaning that it could 
have recovered on a subrogation action if its right to pursue subrogation had not been 
compromised. This circumstance is not present in the instant case. 
The denial of UIM benefits here is not based on a breach of the contract by the 
insured, but as a result of the insured failing to meet a condition precedent for coverage— 
exhaustion of liability benefits. Further, the denial of UIM benefits is not dependent on 
an argument that the insurer lost subrogation rights as a result of the insured's failure to 
exhaust the underlying limits. Regardless of whether the insurer had any desire or 
intention to pursue subrogation, the condition precedent is not met, and no UIM benefits 
are payable. Under that scenario, it is difficult to define the elements necessary to prove 
actual prejudice, other than the fact that State Farm will be required to pay a claim that by 
the express terms of the policy is not payable. This prejudice would obviously be present 
in every case where the exhaustion clause requirement is not met. 
ARGUMENT 
A. UIM EXHAUSTION CLAUSES ARE ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE 
THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH UTAH'S STATUTORILY-
EXPRESSED PUBLIC POLICY. 
Exhaustion clauses are not contrary to Utah's public policy, as Utah's statutory 
scheme anticipates such a precondition to coverage. A state's public policies are 
reflected in its statutes. See Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1269 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (noting that statutes regulating marriage and divorce reflect Utah's public policy on 
marriage); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Hurley, 90 Cal. Rprt. 2d 697, 701 (Cal. App. 4th 1999); 
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Lemna v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 652 N.E.2d 482, 484 (111. App. 3d 1995). Therefore, 
when requirements or limitations on insurance policies are authorized by statute, Utah 
courts reject public policy arguments seeking to invalidate insurance policy provisions 
that are in line with those statutes. See Phillips v. Farmers Ins. Group, No. 20040297-
CA, 2005 UT App. 277 (Utah Ct. App. June 23, 2005). (Attached as Addendum "A".) 
Moreover, this Court has expressed an unwillingness to make modifications to the terms 
of an insurance policy in the absence of specific legislative direction. See Allen v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804-05 (Utah 1992). 
In Allen, the plaintiff argued for the adoption of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine. In declining to adopt that doctrine, this Court stated that it was "unwilling to 
make sweeping modifications in the public policy that underlies the regulation of the 
insurance industry in the absence of legislative direction." Id. at 804. The Court then 
recognized the "active and preeminent" role that Utah's executive and legislative 
branches have taken in the insurance arena, noting that they have established a 
"comprehensive regulatory framework for the insurance industry." Id Therefore, based 
on the lack of any statutory support for the adoption of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine, the Court determined that it could not alter the terms of an insurance policy 
simply because it did not meet the expectations of the insured. Id. at 804-05. 
Utah's UIM waiver provision is one indication of the legislature's willingness to 
permit limitations on UIM coverage. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 
P.3d 97, Tfl6 (Utah 2003). Green involved a consent to settle exclusion in the insurance 
policy which required the insured to obtain written permission from the insurer before 
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settling the liability claim. The plaintiff argued that the exclusion was unenforceable 
because it was inconsistent with Utah's statutory mandate for UIM coverage, unless 
rejected in writing. See id. at |15. The court disagreed, finding that "[w]here the 
statutory scheme allows consumers the option of refusing coverage altogether, it is 
difficult to see how a policy exclusion that simply attaches conditons to coverage could 
be unenforceable as against public policy." Id. at ]fl6. 
Moreover, Utah's statutory scheme specifically anticipates exhaustion of liability 
coverage as a precondition to the recovery of UIM benefits. In Utah, an underinsured 
vehicle is defined as one that "has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the 
injured party for all special and general damages." Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3 
(l)(b). The Utah legislature has established that the inception of loss on a UIM claim is 
the date of the last liability payment. See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(4). 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(5)(a) provides that within five days after 
notice is given to the UIM insurer that all liability limits have been tendered, that carrier 
must either waive its subrogation claim or pay the insured an amount equal to the limits 
tendered by the liability carrier. 
The District Court found that the fact that Utah's statute does not require an 
insurer to waive its subrogation rights until all available liability limits have been 
tendered is a clear indication that the Utah legislature does not consider a UIM claim to 
arise until the liability coverage has been exhausted. (R. at 67.) As stated by that court: 
Because the statute mandates all drivers to have a UIM policy, absent a 
specific set of circumstances, and the statute directs the UIM carriers to pay 
benefits only after all liability insurers have tendered the limits of their 
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policies, the legislature has stated in clear, unambiguous terms both the 
requirements of UIM coverage and the public policy of Utah as well. 
(R. at 67.) 
In this case, not only is State Farm's Policy, specifically the exhaustion clause, not 
contrary to public policy, it mirrors Utah statute and is therefore clearly enforceable. 
That clause provides that UIM coverage is only available "when the limits of liability of 
all bodily injury liability bonds and policies that apply have been used up by payment of 
judgments or settlements" or such limits have at least been offered. (R. at 86.) As 
recognized by the court below, because "Utah does have a statutory scheme that 
contemplates and requires such an exhaustion provision," that provision cannot be void 
for public policy. (R. at 69.) 
Inasmuch as exhaustion clauses are specifically contemplated by Utah statute, they 
are not contrary to Utah's public policy. Although Mr. McArthur will probably cite to 
policy reasons for exhaustion clauses to be void, such concerns do not carry the day in 
light of the public policy established by the legislature. The issue before this Court is 
whether exhaustion clauses comply with Utah's statutorily-expressed public policy, not 
whether those clauses could potentially give rise to any negative outcomes. As 
recognized in Phillips, Allen, and by the District Court, it is the role of the legislature to 
make any policy change in this context. This is especially true in light of the fact that, as 
noted in Green, the legislature has taken an "active and preeminent" role in structuring a 
regulatory framework for the insurance industry. Had the legislature perceived a 
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significant drawback to exhaustion clauses, it certainly would have addressed those 
concerns. Instead, it continues to support such clauses. 
Furthermore, there are important policy considerations that weigh in favor of 
exhaustion clauses, in addition to the statutory approval thereof. One benefit of such 
clauses is lower UIM premiums. The purpose of UIM coverage is to provide affordable, 
secondary and supplemental coverage, not alternative liability coverage. See Green, 89 
P.3d at fflf 18, 45 (noting that UIM coverage is a secondary coverage and recognizing an 
interest in reducing premiums); see also Lindsey v. Southern Farm Bureau, 596 F. Supp. 
2d 1245, 1249 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Curran v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 
829, 835-36 (Alaska 2001); Castle v. Castle, 453 S.E.2d 624, 630 (W. Va. 1994). 
Without an exhaustion requirement, there would be nothing to prevent an insured from 
settling for less than the full limits of the liability policy, then submitting a UIM claim, 
even though his damages may not exceed the liability limit threshold. The UIM carrier 
would be required to expend resources in determining whether the tortfeasor is 
underinsured. These increased costs would only lead to increased UIM premiums. 
Additionally, disregarding exhaustion clauses could lead to a slippery slope by 
which courts and parties would be left with little guidance as to when an insured has 
satisfied its obligations with regard to liability coverage. It would muddle the current 
subgrogation scheme set forth by statute, which might cause two other problems that the 
statute is designed to resolve. First, absent exhaustion, a UIM carrier's subrogation rights 
might be prejudiced. Under the statute the procedure for exercising those rights is neatly 
defined. It is triggered by exhaustion of liability limits and notice of settlement to the 
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UIM carrier. Second, it could interfere with the injured insured's ability to reach a full 
and final settlement with the tortfeasor and provide a full release of all claims to the 
tortfeasor because the status of the UIM carrier's potential subrogation claim against the 
tortfeasor is not neatly resolved as it otherwise would be under the statute when there is 
exhaustion. 
Utah statute currently grants the UIM carrier five days after receiving notice that 
all liability limits have been tendered to waive its subgrogation claim or pay the insured 
an amount equal to the liability limits tendered by the carrier. See Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-22-305.3(5)(a). If the liability limits are not paid or tendered, the insured has no 
statutory obligation to give notice of the proposed settlement to the UIM carrier. And if 
the insured is permitted to bring a UIM claim without payment or tender of the full limits, 
then the UIM carrier's subrogation right might still exist because the five-day statute 
would not control, which in turn could result in the insured being unwilling to give a full 
release to the tortfeasor, but reserving claims for UIM benefits. Without a full release, 
the tortfeasor's insurer may be unwilling to pay the settlement monies while still leaving 
its insured subject to potential personal liability for the UIM carrier's later subrogation 
claim. 
Exhaustion clauses are consistent with Utah's statutorily-expressed public policy. 
The statute is designed to promote settlement of the underlying liability claims. The 
contract exhaustion clause follows the statute's direction. Invalidating the exhaustion 
clause would not be consistent with Utah's statute and would interfere with the statute's 
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well-organized procedures and policies. Accordingly, this Court should find that the 
UIM exhaustion clause at issue is enforceable. 
B. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AN EXHAUSTION CLAUSE IS NOT 
DEPENDENT UPON THE INSURER ESTABLISHING PREJUDICE 
TO ITS ECONOMIC INTEREST BECAUSE EXHAUSTION 
CLAUSES ARE SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATED BY UTAH 
PUBLIC POLICY AND ARE A FUNDAMENTAL PRECONDITION 
TO COVERAGE. 
The second certified question inquires whether, even if the exhaustion clause is 
generally enforceable as not in violation of Utah's public policy, actual enforcement is 
contingent upon the insurer establishing prejudice to its economic interest. Presumably, 
the prejudice which the question refers to would need to be proven in cases where the 
insurer is required to pay UIM benefits even though the liability limits have not been paid 
or tendered. 
This Court should answer the question "no." An insurer should not be required to 
establish prejudice each time an exhaustion clause's requirements are not met, as such 
clauses are contemplated by Utah's statutory scheme and are a precondition to UIM 
coverage under the policy. 
The prejudice issue was addressed in this Court's holding in Green. As noted 
above, that case involved a consent to settle exclusion that the insured had breached. 
Therefore, this Court considered "whether the breach was a material breach relieving 
State Farm of its obligation to pay benefits under the UIM policy or an immaterial breach 
that does not void coverage." The Court first ascertained the proper standard to apply in 
determining materiality. Green, 2003 UT 48, fflf 27-28. The Court adopted the actual 
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prejudice standard, citing to the holdings from a number of other jurisdictions which 
found that "in order to justify foreclosing an insured's right to indemnification from an 
otherwise applicable underinsured motorist coverage, an insurer must show that it was 
prejudiced by the settlement of the tort claim." Id. at pO (emphasis added, internal 
quotations omitted). Therefore, in order to deny coverage based on a breach of the 
consent to settle exclusion, an insurer must show that "it would have had a realistic 
possibility of recovering from the tortfeasor had its subrogation right not been foreclosed 
by the insured's settlement. . . ." Id at f 33. In short, the Court recognized the essential 
purpose of the consent to settle clause was to protect the insurer's right of subrogation. 
This instant case is distinguishable from Green, and the bases behind the economic 
prejudice requirement established in that case are not present here. First, State Farm is 
not alleging that Mr. McArthur breached his contract, as was the case in Green. This 
difference is significant because "[i]t is well-settled law that one party's breach excuses 
further performance by the non-breaching party if the breach is material." Orlob v. 
Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 430, 1J26, 124 P.3d 269. Therefore, as held in 
Green, when an insurer seeks to completely foreclose an insured's right to recovery based 
on a breach, an insurer must establish that its economic interests have been prejudiced. 
In this instance, State Farm does not claim that Mr. McArthur breached the Policy, 
it is rather enforcing a condition precedent to coverage - the exhaustion clause. There is 
a fundamental difference between denying coverage based on a breach and denying based 
on a failure to satisfy a precondition. In the case of a breach, the insured is being denied 
a right that had otherwise accrued under the policy. However, if a condition precedent 
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has not been satisfied, then the insured's rights have never arisen under the policy, nor 
have the insurer's obligations. See Watkins v. Henry Day Ford, 2010 UT App 243, ^|18, 
239 P.3d 526 (finding that "where the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon 
the occurrence or existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not require 
performance by the obligor, because the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right 
to demand performance, does not arise until that condition occurs or exists") (internal 
quotations omitted). Moreover, the insured may still have the opportunity to satisfy the 
condition and therefore recover under the policy, whereas a breach forever precludes 
coverage. If an insurer is required to establish prejudice, even though coverage has not 
been triggered, then the policy, not to mention the freedom to contract, is essentially 
rendered meaningless. 
Second, the primary basis for a consent to settle exclusion like the one at issue in 
Green is to protect the insurer's right to subrogate against the tortfeasor. As such, this 
Court wished to ensure that an insurer does not deny coverage based on a mere technical 
breach, the failure to obtain the insurer's approval to settle, when the insurer had no 
intention or ability to recover from the tortfeasor in the first place. See Green, 2003 UT 
48, m 31-32. By contrast, exhaustion clauses serve a much broader and fundamental 
purpose - to ensure that the tortfeasor is actually underinsured and therefore the insured 
is entitled to the secondary/excess UIM coverage in the first place. The primary purpose 
of the exhaustion clause is not to protect subrogation rights, even though subrogation is 
resolved under the UIM statutory scheme. See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(5)(a). 
14 
Another difference between Green and the present case is that a consent to settle 
exclusion actually prevents an insured from settling the underlying case, even if the 
settlement is for the full liability limits. As such, one concern that came into play in 
Green was ensuring that UIM carriers are not permitted to exercise unfettered control 
over the underlying litigation. See id. at ^18-19.* By establishing an actual prejudice 
requirement, the Green court made it unlikely that an insurer would attempt to maintain 
such control. By contrast, an exhaustion clause does not grant the insurer the power to 
block settlement of the liability dispute. An insured has the right and ability to settle for 
less than the full liability limits, and in many instances it certainly makes sense to do so. 
Finally, from a practical standpoint, it would be difficult to establish a method by 
which an insurer could prove prejudice as a result of the insured's failure to exhaust 
liability limits. In Green, the insurer could establish prejudice simply by showing that it 
"would have had a realistic possibility of recovering from the tortfeasor . . . . " Id at f 33. 
There is no such easy test for the exhaustion requirement, nor should one be necessary, 
because that requirement is about much more than preserving an insurer's right to 
subrogation. Indeed, it could be argued that a UIM carrier faces economic prejudice in 
every instance where it is required to adjust a UIM claim, despite the lack of exhaustion, 
because it must expend resources investigating a UIM claim that is not ripe. 
Accordingly, it is clear that a prejudice standard would be an improper and unnecessary 
hurdle to the enforcement of exhaustion clauses. Further, economic prejudice would 
1
 The statute requiring a UIM insurer to respond within five days to notification that all 
liability limits have been tendered was not in effect at the time of the accident in Green. 
L±atljl9,n.4. 
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arguably be present in every case where a UIM carrier is required to pay a claim for 
which, under the unambigous terms of the contract, there is no coverage. 
As established in Section A, UIM exhaustion is contemplated and permitted by 
Utah statute, and is therefore in line with Utah's public policy. In light of that specific 
legislative support, a prejudice requirement should not be presumed, especially in light of 
the fact that exhaustion is a fundamental precondition to coverage. If an insured has 
failed to exhaust the applicable liability limits, then UIM coverage has not been triggered. 
That should end the inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should answer the certified questions by 
finding that exhuastion clauses are enforceable under Utah law and that no showing of 
economic prejudice is required to uphold such clauses. 
DATED t h i s 2 > day of February, 2011 
STRONG & HANNI 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Andrew D. Wright 
Andrew B. McDaniel 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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OPINION BY: Gregory K. Orme 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
We have determined that "the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs 
and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented are readily resolved under applicable 
law. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
See Guardian Title Co. v. Mitchell, 2002 UT 63, P 12, 54 P.3d 130. "In reviewing a summary 
judgment, we accord no deference to the trial court and review its ruling for correctness." Price 
Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, P 9, 995 P.2d 1237. 
The trial court [ * 2 ] held that Utah Code section 31A-22-305(8)(b) specifically authorized 
Farmers to prohibit Chansse Phillips from recovering undennsured motorist benefits given the 
undisputed facts of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(8)(b) (2003). Phillips now 
appeals the trial court's decision on the ground that section 305 is ambiguous and cannot be 
harmonized with other portions of the statute. We disagree. 
The statute in effect at the time of the accident clearly provided that an insurance carrier was 
required to offer undennsured motorist coverage only "for covered persons who are legally 
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of undennsured motor vehicles," ch. 
188, § 1, 2000 Laws of Utah 627, 628, and that the term "undennsured motor vehicle" does 
not include "a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same policy that 
also contains the undennsured motorist coverage." Id. These provisions clearly and 
unambiguously preclude Phillips's claim. 
Because such policy provisions limiting undennsured motorist coverage are specifically 
authorized by statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(8)(b)(i) [ * 3 ] , (in) (2003), we reject 
Phillips's public policy argument. See Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 
804 (Utah 1992) (noting court's unwillingness "to make sweeping modifications in the public 
policy that underlies the regulation of the insurance industry in the absence of legislative 
direction" and its "tradition of deferring to the legislature on questions of general policy when 
considering the validity of insurance policies"). 
Finally, Phillips has not met her "heavy burden'" of demonstrating that the statute violates her 
due process right to receive compensation for her injuries. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, P 8, 
84 P.3d 1171 (citation omitted). Her brief is devoid of any meaningful analysis addressing the 
statute's unconstitutionality, and thus we decline to consider her due process argument. See 
Beehive Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2004 UT 18, P 14, 89 P.3d 131; State v. Garner, 2002 
UT App 234, P 12, 52 P.3d 467. 
Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
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of record in the county in which ihc arbitration is 
pending iq select a third one. The written, deci-
sion of any I wo arbitrators shall be binding on 
each party. 
The cost'of "the arbitrator and anycxpert witness 
shall Wpaici 'by the party who hired them. The 
cost of'the tnird arbitrator and other expenses of 
arbitration shall be shared equally by both par-
tics. 
The arbitration shall take place in the county in 
which 'the insured resides unless the panics 
agree to another place. State court rules gov-
erning procedure and admission of evidence 
shall be used. 
y/e arc rjot bound by any judgment against any 
person or .organization' obtained without our 
written consent. 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
— COVERAGE W 
You have, this coverage, i( MV/" appears in the 
"Coverages'" space on the'declarations page. 
Wei'wjlJ'pay damages' for 'bodily Injun an in-
surd d is legally entitled "to collect from the owner 
or driver o? an underinsured motor vehicle. The 
bodily injury must be sustained by an insured 
ana"caused by accident'arising out of the opera-
tion, maintenance or use of an underinsured 
motor vehicle, 
THEft&IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 
i ;• .-/THE LIMITS OF.LIABILITY OF ALL 
BODILYINIURY LIABILITY BONDS 
AND -POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE 
BEEN-. USED UP-BY PAYMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS . OR SETTLEMENTS 
JO]OTHERfERSONS\OK ' 
2, SUCH 'LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR 
REMAINING PART OF THEM HAVE 
BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED. 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle 
motor vehicle: 
means a land 
1, the ownership, maintenance or use or 
which is insured or.bonded Tor bodily 
injury liability al ih"c lime of the acci-
dent; and 
2. whose limits of liability'for bodily in-
jury liability: 
a. arc less than the amount of the in-
sured's damages; or 
b. have been reduced by payments to 
persons other than the insured lo 
less than the amount of the in* 
sured's damages. 
14 
9844.4 
An underinsured motor vehicle docs not include 
a land muuir vehicle: 
1. insured under the liability coverage of 
this policy; 
2. furnished for the rcgulnr use ;of you, 
your spouse or any relative', 
3. owned by any government or any of its 
political subdivisions or agencies; 
4. designed' for use mainly off public roads 
except while on public roads; 
5. while located for use-as premises; or 
6. denned as an "uriirisuretj motor vehh 
cle" in'your policy. 
Who Is an Insured - Coverage W 
Insured - means the person or persons covered 
by underinsured motor vehicle coverage. 
This is: 
1. the first person named -in the declara-
tions; 
2. ' his or her- spouse) 
3. their relatives] and 
4. any othtt person while occupying] 
a. your car, • a temporary substitute 
car, a newly acquired car, or a 
trailer attached to such a car. Such 
vehicle' has to be used within the 
•scope of the .consent of you or your 
spouse; or 
b. a car not owned by or teased lo 
you, your spouse or any relative^ or 
a trailer attached to such a car, k 
has to be driven by the firsi person 
named, in the. declarations or thai 
person's spouse and within the 
scope of th'e pwner's consent. 
Such o\her.person occupying a vehicle 
used to carry persons for a. charge is not 
an insured, 
5. nny'person entitled to recover damages 
because of bodily injury 'to an insured 
under 1 through A above. 
Deciding Fault and Amount- Coverage W 
Two questions must be decided by agreement 
between the insured and us: 
1. Is ihe insured legally entitled to collect 
damages from the owner or driver of the 
underinsured motor vehicle; and 
2. If so, in what amount? 
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be 
decided by arbitration upon written request of ihe 
20571546 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAVIS MCARTHUR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY; DOES 1 through 
100; and ROB CORPORATIONS 1 liirough 
10, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
! FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CaseNo.2:09-CV-416TS 
This matter is before the Court on the parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, and 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Declarations of A. Bryce Dixon, This dispute arises over an 
exhaustion provision in the underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage in the policy provided to 
Plaintiff by Defendant1 Plaintiff argues that this provision is void for public.policy, while 
Defendant maintains it is in line with and in furtherance of Utah's statutory language. Defendant 
argues that Mr, Dixon's declarations should be stricken because he represents Plaintiff and 
docket No. 13 at f 13; Docket No. 16 at 2. 
1 
000061 
therefore should not be permitted to offer testimony in this case. Because the declarations of Mr, 
Dixon could effect the outcome of the summary judgment motion it will be addressed first. 
I. Jurisdiction and Venue 
This Court has jurisdiction on the basis of Diversity of Citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a), because the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy, Plaintiff's personal 
injuries and hospital expenses, exceeds $75,000. 
H, Factual Background 
Defendant disputes a portion of Plaintiffs undisputed facts. Under normal circumstances 
when considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court would take the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party."2 In this case, however, the Court is presented with cross 
motions for summary judgment Therefore, the Court will recite only those facts which appear to 
be obvious and undisputed in order to put the issue into context. 
Plaintiff was involved in an accident while operating his motorcycle3 Plaintiff received 
$90,000 of the $100,000 liability insurance policy from the tortfeasor's liability earner.4 Plaintiff 
made a demand on Defendant to pay its pohcy limits of UIM coverage of S100,000.5 Defendant 
denied the claim because Plaintiff was not paid the full liability limits of the tortfeasor's 
insurance policy.6 Plaintiff brought this action seeking payment of the pohcy limits of his UIM 
"Durham v. Herbert Olbrioh GMBH& Co., 404 F.3d 12*9, 1250 (10th Or. 2005) 
(quoting Riley v Brown & Root, Inc., 896 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
3DocketNo 1 at «fl 7, Docket No 16 at 5. 
4DocketNo 1 at ^27, Docket No 5 at f 27. 
5DocketNo. 1 at 126, Docket No 5 atf 26. 
6Docket No 1 at %21\ Docket No. 5 at % 27. 
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policy. 
HI. Motion to Strike 
Defendant argues this Court should strike the Declarations of A. Bryce Dixon based on 
Fed. R Civ. P. 56(e)(1) and Rule 3.7(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Plaintiff has 
not filed a response to this Motion, therefore the Court is entitled under DUCiv R 7-1(d) to grant 
the motion without further notice.7 However, before granting the motion, the Court will briefly 
address additional rationale in support of its conclusion. 
In support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Dixon has submitted a 
declaration containing at least three statements of opinion: 
1) My evaluation of Mr. McArthnr *s general damages -from the said motorcycle 
accident was that they exceeded $200,000. 
2) Because of his impecunious circumstances Mr. McArthur was constrained to 
accept a $90,000 settlement of the available 5100,000 in liability, 
3) Because the tortfeasor's insurance carrier refused to pay full policy limits, Mr. 
McArthur's only alternative was to file a lawsuit against the tortfeasor, However, 
the cost in time and money for such a suit would have been much greater than the 
additional $ 10,000 insurance he was entitled to recover for his injuries against the 
liability carrier of the tortfeasor. Therefore, he felt compelled by his 
circumstances to accept less than policy limits.8 
The issue presently before the Court is a legal one, whether or not the exhaustion clause 
is valid, or void for public policy. Therefore the Court finds the statements made by Mr. Dixon 
in his declaration both unnecessary and irrelevant to the matter at hand. Moreover, the 
statements are in the nature of opinion, not fact, and therefore do not meet the requirements of 
Fed. R. Civ. P, 56 (e)(1),9 If the statements were relevant to the matter at hand, this Court might 
7DUCivR 74(d). 
8DoclcetNo. 14, at ^ 3 , 5, 6.; Docket No. 13 atffl 11, 19, 20. 
9Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1) ("A supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal 
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is 
competent to testify on the matters stated.") 
3 
consider them because the rationale for excluding the advocate from testifying are not currently 
present.10 Because there is no jury at this point in time, the Court finds these statements would 
neither confuse nor mislead the Court, regarding the attorney's role as both an advocate and a 
witness, in its determination of this issue,11 
Regardless, the Court finds these are opinion statements, not relevant to the current 
determination and therefore will strike the declaration. Moreover, because Plaintiff has not 
responded to this Motion the Court will grant it. 
IIL Summary Judgment 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.n In considering whether 
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented,13 "When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial, if he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him."14 
B. Discussion 
Under Utah law, insurance policies are construed "pursuant to the same rules applied to 
l0See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3,7, Comment 1,1, available at 
http://vi^w.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/chl3/3_7fchtm 
uId, 
nSeeTzv RCrv.P. 56(c). 
nSee Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 XJ.S 242,249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 
F.2dl82, 183 (10thCir. 1991). 
14FED. RCrv.P, 56(e)(2). 
ordinary contracts,'>15 The existence of ambiguity in a contract is a question of law,16 If an 
insurance policy is ambiguous, all doubts are resolved in favor of the insured,17 If, however, the 
policy is clear and unambiguous, the language is "construed according to its usual and ordinary 
meaning."18 
A state's statutes are a reflection of its public policies,19 If the plain language is 
unambiguous then the Court need not look beyond it, and no other interpretive tools are needed 
in analyzing the statute.20 In Utah, an underinsured motor vehicle is one that "has insufficient 
liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages."23 
"The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage is secondary to the liability coverage of an 
owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle..
 4"
22
 Utah law provides: 
Within five business days after notification that all liability insurers have tendered 
their liability policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either (i) waive any 
subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have against the person liable for 
the injuries caused in the accident; or (ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the 
policy limits tendered by the liability carrier.23 
l5State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, v. DeHenera, 145 P.3d 1 172, 1174 (Utah Ct. App, 
2006) (quoting Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 133 P.3d 428,432 (Utah 2006)) (internal citations 
omitted), 
[eAlfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272,1274 (Utah 1993). 
11
 Id. (citing Fuller v, Dir. of Fin., 694 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1985); Utah Farm Bureau 
v, Onnlle Andrews & Sons, 665 P.2d 1308,1309 (Utah 1983)), 
"Id. (citing Fire Ins. JExck v. Alsop} D.C, 709 P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985)). 
19Farmers Ins. Exck v. Hurley, 90 CaL Rptr. 2d. 697, 701 (Cal. App. 4th 1999); Lemna v. 
United Seiys. Auto Ass 'n, 652 N,E.2d 482, 484 (01. App. 3d 1995), 
MR&RIndus. Parkf LLC v. Utah Prop, and Cas. Ins, Guar. Ass'iu, 199 P.3d 917, 921-
23 (Utah 2008) (citing Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998); State v. Barret, 127 P.3d 
682, 689 (Utah 2005)). 
21UTAHCODEANK. § 31A-22-3Q5.3(l)(b)(i). 
Z2Id. §31A~22-305.3(2)(f)(i). 
*Id. § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a) (emphasis added), 
5 
Utah requires insurance companies provide UIM coverage to every person in Utah who drives a 
motor vehicle,24 UIM coverage may only be waived by an insured through an express written 
form that "includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of the underinsured motorist 
coverage and when it would be applicable."25 
Insurance contracts are treated no differently than ordinary contracts, and interpretation 
begins with the terms themselves.26 The contract in question contains the following "exhaustion 
clause" provision: 
We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled 
to recover from the owner or driver of an underinsured motorist vehicle. Bodily 
inury must be sustained by an insured and caused by an accident arising out of the 
operation, maintenance> or use of an underinsured motor vehicle. 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 
1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILYJNJURY 
LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE 
BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR 
SETTLEMENTS TO OTEEELJPEKSONS; OR 
2, SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART OF THEM HAVE 
BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED21 
This clause is both clear and unambiguous, and therefore will be "construed according to its 
usual and ordinary meaning.n2S tcWhen the language of the contract is unambiguous, then the 
parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract."29 Therefore, the 
contract provision will stand unless it can be declared void for public policy. 
Decisions voiding exhaustion clauses on public policy grounds generally do not have 
2003). 
7AId. §31A-22-305.3(2)(b). 
25K§31A-22~305.3(2)(g). 
^DeHeirera, 145 P.3d at 1174. 
27DocketNo. 16-3 at 15. 
28
^/,850P.2datl274 
29
 Fortress Fin. & Pension Sew., Inc v. WatHns, 2003 WL 22753026, at *2 (Nov. 13, 
state statutes authorizing or suggesting such provisions; instead the exhaustion provision is only 
contained in the insurance policy itself.30 Other jurisdictions with a governing statute have Telied 
on the plain meaning of the language in the statute in upholding exhaustion provisions.31 At least 
one court has held the exhaustion provision to be void against public policy only when it was 
expanded to Tequire the injured part}' to folly recover against a tortfeasor who was neither the 
owner nor operator of the motor vehicle causing the injury.32 
As discussed above, the Utah underinsured statute states, "[wjithin five business days 
after notification that all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy limits.. ,"33 the 
underinsured carrier must either pay the insured or waive subrogation Tights.34 The Merriam-
Webster Dictionary defines limit as the utmost extent.35 The plain meaning of this provision 
must therefore be interpreted as an exhaustion clause. The insurer only has to pay within five 
days of notification that the utmosi amount of the liability policy of the torfeasor has been paid. 
Because the statute mandates all drivers to have aUIM policy, absent a specific .set of 
circumstances, and the statute directs the UIM carriers to pay benefits only after all liability 
insurers have tendered the limits of their policies, the legislature has stated in clear, unambiguous 
terms both the requirements of TOM coverage and the public policy of Utah as well. 
The contract language mirrors the statute in requiring the limits of the other available 
liability policies be paid out before the underinsured carrier, Defendant in this case, is liable to 
make additional payments to the insured. Although the Court is cognizant of the compelling 
public policy reasons for exhaustion clauses generally to be void for public policy, in the face of 
^Hurley, 90 Cal. Rptr, 2d. at 700; Curran v. Progressive Noiihwestem Insur. Co., 29 
P.3d 829, 838 (Alaska 2001); see also Danbeckv. American Family Mutual Insur. Co.> 605 
RW.2d 925, 928 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
"Zindsey v. Southern Farm Bureau, 596 F,Supp.2d 1245,1249 (W.D. Ark. 2009). 
22Pa. Mfrs, Ass 'n. v. Gordon, 1993 WL 427372, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,1993). 
33UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a). 
"Id. at § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a)(iHii). 
3SThe Merriam-Webster Dictionary 302 (1998). 
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clear language from the legislature it will refrain from so holding. The Court understands and is 
sympathetic to the legitimate policy concerns, but does not believe its role is to make policy and 
will leave that duty to the legislature, 
Additionally the Court is aware of other challenges to the limitations of Utah's 
underinsured motorist coverage whose public policy arguments were rejected by the Utah Court 
of Appeals. In Phillips v, Farmers Insurance Group ^  plaintiff challenged a trial court ruling 
that the Utah Code section 31A-22-305(8)(b) specifically authorized Farmers to deny coverage 
under that provision, Looking at the statute as a whole, and the provided definition of 
'"underinsured motor vehicle" the court found the provisions "clearly and unambiguously" 
precluded the plaintiffs claim.37 The court went on to state that it rejected plaintiffs public 
policy argument because the policy provisions that limit underinsured motorist coverage are 
specifically authorized by the statute.38 
In State Farm Mutual Auto, Insur, Co, v. Green,39 the Supreme Court of Utah also 
rejected a public policy argument to void a contractual provision in a UIM coverage plan. That 
case dealt with a consent to settle exclusion which required the insured to procure State Farm's 
written consent before entering into any settlement agreement40 Plaintiff argued that giving the 
insurer instead of the victim control over litigation frustrated the scamte's goal of making 
recovery available for victims of underinsured motorists.41 The court stated that "[wjhere a 
statutory scheme allows consumers the option of refusing coverage altogether, it is difficult to 
see how a policy that simply attaches conditions to coverage could be unenforceable as against 
362005 WL 1477061 (Utah Ct. App June 23, 2005). 
37Zd.at*J. 
38/rf, 
3989P3d 97 (Utah 2003). 
*Id. at 101-102. 
41Jd.atl01. 
public policy."42 The events surrounding the Green case occurred before the current exhaustion 
clause was included in the statutory framework, and therefore the court noted the requirement 
that an "insurer respond within five business days to notification that 'all liability insurers have 
tendered their liability policy limits/'' is inapplicable to this case43 The Green court also used 
the above provision to contravene plaintiffs argument that the consent to settle violates the 
purpose of the scheme, therefore, violating public policy.44 
Although the Green court ultimately found that the insured must be paid, the basis for 
that holding was that the breach, in noi getting the proper consent from State Farm, was not a 
material breach. That outcome is distinguishable from the situation currently before the Court. 
First, the Green court specifically acknowledged the statutory scheme controlling the present 
litigation and alluded to the fact that had the current legislation controlled that case the outcome 
would have been different.45 Second, the exhaustion requirement is a condition precedent to 
recovery from the UIM carrier, not an ordinary term capable of being breached by either party. 
A breach of this term would only occur if the liability limit was exhausted and the UIM carrier 
still refused to pay. 
To reiterate, because Utah does have a statutory scheme that contemplates and requires 
such an exhaustion provision the Court finds this clause is not void for pub he policy. 
Plaintiff Tehes on Utah's long held public policy of encouraging settlements to argue the 
exhaustion clause contravenes Utah's public policy 46 Plaintiff also ekes case law voiding 
contract provisions m an attorney-client fee agreement which give the attorney control over the 
settlement of a lawsuit because such provisions "run afoul of the policy to encourage settlements 
*Id. 
«Id at 102. 
"Id. 
"Id. 
%vn Head Construction, Inc v Gurney* 207 P.3d 1231,1235 (Utah 2009). 
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of causes and differences between persons,"47 Plaintiff cites to two cases, one from Montana and 
the .other from Nevada, specifically holding an exhaustion clause void for public policy, both .are-
distinguishable.48 The Augustine court recognized that "[n]either the Montana Legislature nor 
this Court have specifically addressed the issue of whether an exhaustion clause in an 
underinsurance policy is enforceable under public policy,"49 Similarly, because the Nevada 
statutes do not include an exhaustion clause, the Mann court concluded that the "Nevada 
Legislature intended that uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits be available to Nevada 
citizens/150 
Unlike Montana.and .Nevada, the Utah legislature has addressed the issue, The 
underinsured statute itself contains language contemplating the situation. It instructs 
underinsured carriers to make payments to the insured, within five business days after being 
notified that "all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy limits."51 Because -the Utah 
legislature has included the equivalent of an exhaustion clause within the statutory frame work 
itself, and state statutes are reflections of the State's public policies, the contract provision in 
question cannot be a violation of such policies, Second, the exhaustion requirement is a 
condition precedent to recovery from the IHM carrier, not an ordinary term capable of being 
breached by either party. A breach of this term would only occur if the liability limit was 
exhausted and the UIM carrier still Tefused to pay, this is not the situation currently before the 
Court. Moreover, as previously discussed, this Court will leave policy determinations to the . 
legislature, 
^Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Grayston Pines Homeowners' Assoc, 789 P.2d 52, 55 
(UtahCLApp, 1990). * 
*
lAugustine v, Simonson, 940 P.2d 116; Mann v. Farmers Ins, Exck, 836 P.2d 620 (Nev. 
1992), Both cases held the exhaustion clauses to be void for public policy based on the same 
rationale, The courts stated the provision, promotes litigation and expenses, delays payment of 
benefits, fails to consider legitimate reasons for settlement, and fails to acknowledge alternatives 
to protect the UIM carriers, 
»Id. 
50Id. at 649-650; compare Augustine, 940 P.2d at 120. 
51Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-305.3(5)(a). 
10 
IV. Bad Faith 
Because the Court finds the contract provision is valid, the Court finds Defendant did not 
act in bad faith, Therefore, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs bad faith claim. 
V, Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above the Court finds the declarations made by A, Bryce Dixon to 
be irrelevant to the issue at hand and are not factual in nature as required by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Court also finds the contractual provision to be in line with the applicable 
statutes and is therefore not void for public policy, It is therefore 
ORDERED feat Defendant's Motion to Strike Declarations of A, Bryce Dixon (Docket 
No. 18) is GRANTED. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pocket No. 15) is 
GRANTED. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 12) is DENIED. 
At oral argument Plaintiffs counsel made an oral request to certify this question to the 
Utah Supreme Court. This Court does not deem an oral request at oral argument as sufficient for 
such a request. Further, this Court does not believe it is an appropriate issue for certification. 
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a judgment in favor of Defendant. 
DATED December 9, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
TED S ^ W A ^ t 
United $£at£s District Judge 
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